DCNF EXCLUSIVE: Owner Of US Defense Contractor Making Fighter Jet, Missile Parts Listed As Chinese Intel Agency Official

A defense contractor that supplies parts for American military aircraft and advises the U.S. government on supply chain security is owned by an immigrant with extensive ties to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intelligence and influence agencies, a Daily Caller News Foundation investigation has found.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has awarded tens of millions of dollars in defense contracts for fighter jet, attack helicopter and guided missile launcher parts to S&L Aerospace Metals LLC, a New York-based company that serves on a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) council on critical manufacturing. However, S&L’s CEO Jerry Wang — whose Chinese name is Wang Jue — has been identified as an official for multiple CCP influence and intelligence organizations in Chinese government and state media reports, raising concerns about the defense contractor’s connections to Communist Party elites — including Chinese dictator, Xi Jinping.

Through an attorney, Wang denied any ties to “foreign political entities,” but did not deny being photographed at numerous Chinese government and CCP intel agency functions alongside high-ranking Party officials.

“Allowing someone with Wang’s background access to the inner workings of U.S. supply chains and critical manufacturing vulnerabilities is a glaring national security failure,” said L.J. Eads, a former U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst, after reviewing the DCNF’s findings. “It’s incredibly naive to think that the CCP is going to play by the rules when we hand them a front-row seat to our most sensitive industries.”

DOD and DHS did not respond to multiple requests for comment. (RELATED: EXCLUSIVE: Chinese Communist Party Quietly Operates Shadow Justice System In US Cities)

‘Proxies For CCP Interests’

While leading S&L, several organizations run by a CCP intelligence and Chinese influence arm called the United Front Work Department (UFWD) have identified the aerospace CEO as a member.

The UFWD’s operations are a “unique blend of engagement, influence activities, and intelligence operations that the [CCP] uses to shape its political environment, including to influence other countries’ policy toward the [People’s Republic of China] and to gain access to advanced foreign technology,” according to the House Select Committee on the CCP.

“Our defense industrial base is dangerously dependent on our foremost adversary. Reports that individuals linked to the CCP United Front are in control of key U.S. defense contractors are shocking,” Michigan Republican Rep. John Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP, told the DCNF. “No entity or individual affiliated with the CCP United Front — an organization dedicated to advancing CCP interests — should ever have been allowed to infiltrate our defense supply chains. This is likely just the tip of the iceberg, and we must urgently address these vulnerabilities to safeguard our national security.”

Chinese government records and state media reports identify Wang as a “director” of one UFWD organization called the China Overseas Friendship Association (COFA), which is “an important platform through which the UFWD co-opts and interacts with overseas United Front figures,” according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

May 2019 footage from a COFA conference in Beijing shows Wang applauding Xi Jinping. Chinese government and UFWD social media posts that include footage of a June 2019 COFA assembly in Hangzhou, Zhejiang also identify Wang as a “deputy chairman” of COFA’s Zhejiang branch. Wang is pictured alongside other COFA officials on a dais with a name card identifying him at the June 2019 event.

Photos also show Wang at several New York welcome events for Xi as far back as May 2006, when Wang organized a party for China’s future leader, according to Chinese state media. One photo from the 2006 gathering pictures Wang presenting a statue of a bald eagle to Xi, who then served as the Zhejiang provincial Party secretary, and another state media image shows them together holding a piece of calligraphy.

An S&L spokesperson told the DCNF by email that Wang has not belonged to any organizations serving the CCP or the UFWD.

“Mr. Wang does not have any ties to any foreign political entities,” the spokesperson wrote.

Wang’s attorney, Christopher E. Chang, insisted that his client had no ties to foreign political entities after the DCNF inquired about some 13 photos picturing Wang at Chinese government functions alongside high-ranking Party officials. However, when pressed about whether Wang denied being in those photographs, Chang replied: “no.”

One of those photos, which was included in a March 2011 Chinese government announcement, shows Wang in Beijing with the deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other overseas delegates attending the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

“CPPCC delegates attend a high-profile annual meeting to receive direction from the CCP regarding the ways its policies should be characterized” and “serve as proxies for CCP interests,” according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. The CPPCC charter states delegates must “facilitate implementation of state foreign policy,” “take advantage of the CPPCC as a United Front organization” and even “keep state secrets.”

A September 2019 Chinese state media article also pictures Wang in Beijing at an event held by the UFWD and one of its agencies called the All-China Federation Of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC). ACFROC identifies Wang as both an “overseas committee member” as well as the “executive deputy chairman” of its Zhejiang youth committee.

The September 2019 picture shows Wang in a group photo with Linda Sun, a former aide to New York Democratic Gov. Kathy Hochul, who was indicted in August for acting as a Chinese agent. Among other things, the Department of Justice alleges ACFROC hired Sun as a committee member at some point while she was in Beijing attending events with ACFROC and the UFWD in September 2019.

Years prior, Wang and Sun both attended a December 2008 welcome banquet in New York for ACFROC’s then-chairman, Lin Jun, footage shows. The DCNF also sent Wang’s attorney a screenshot taken from that footage showing Wang seated beside the intel agency chief.

Wang’s apparent Chinese government and intelligence ties would pose a national security threat in light of S&L’s defense contracting work, Edward L. Haugland, a former military and intelligence analyst, told the DCNF.

China aims to “leverage the gaps and seams in the soft underbelly in our national security to exploit, subvert, and enable direct attacks on our infrastructure, personnel, and governance, which they will exploit tactically and strategically,” Haugland said. “The inherent access, even to unclassified information, about our government’s security measures, practices and protocols gives exceptional insights to any adversary.”

‘Blatant National Security Threat’

S&L has received approximately $60 million in defense contracts and subcontracts, and serves on a DHS council for critical manufacturing security, according to the U.S. government.

Founded in 1947, S&L Aerospace originally produced bicycle parts, but transitioned into the aerospace industry in the 1950’s, its archived website states. Wang immigrated to the U.S. from China in 1986, according to the New York City Economic Development Corporation, and became S&L’s CEO in 2001 after acquiring the firm with a partner.

In 2009, Wang became the sole owner of S&L, which USASpending.gov classifies as a “minority owned business.” S&L now counts the Pentagon and many of the largest U.S. military aircraft manufacturers as its clients.

Among others, S&L’s website states it produces parts for Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Fighting Falcon and F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, as well as several of the aerospace giant’s military helicopters, including the CH-53K King Stallion, MH-60R Seahawk, and UH-60M Black Hawk. S&L has also won Lockheed Martin contracts for the CH-53 Sea Stallion, according to HigherGov, a website providing government contracting analytics.

A Lockheed Martin spokesperson told the DCNF the firm takes a “multi-faceted approach to assess and mitigate supply chain risks” and complies with “all applicable laws and regulations, including those related to supply chain risk management in our business dealings.”

Wang’s company also manufactures parts for Boeing’s commercial jets, like the 747, as well as some of the Fortune 500 company’s military aircraft, including the C-17 Globemaster III transport plane and the H-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter, according to its website. HigherGov’s records also reveal S&L has won contracts to produce parts for Boeing’s F-15 Eagle and F/A-18E Hornet fighter jets.

Boeing did not respond to multiple requests for comment.

However, according to HigherGov, S&L’s most lucrative contracts have come from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which oversees the global defense supply chain for “the five military services, 11 combatant commands, other federal, state and local agencies and partner and allied nations,” its website states.

Federal records reveal the Pentagon has awarded S&L contracts to produce a variety of parts for combat aircraft and even weapon systems.

For example, S&L has an ongoing $3.3 million contract for “aircraft landing gear components,” according to USASpending.gov, and another ongoing $24.3 million contract to produce “cylinders and pistons” for the U.S. Army, a Pentagon announcement states. At the same time, Wang’s company has also won weapon systems contracts for “small arms, ordnance and ordnance accessories manufacturing” as well as multiple contracts for “launchers, guided missile.”

A DLA spokesperson told the DCNF that the Pentagon requires agencies to mitigate risks related to foreign ownership, control or influence for contractors and subcontractors.

However, Eads characterized the U.S. military’s vetting process for defense contractors as a “self-disclosure system” with “significant blind spots.”

“Contractors are largely expected to provide information about their ownership and potential foreign influence themselves, and there’s limited enforcement to independently verify or investigate those claims,” Eads said.

Consequently, even a defense contractor with apparent Chinese government affiliations, like Wang, may go undetected, Eads said.

After reviewing the DCNF’s findings, Brian O’Shea, a former military and intelligence analyst, said that a U.S. defense contractor with Chinese government ties would pose a threat to the U.S. military’s supply chain.

“Logistics would be the key area in terms of an attack vector,” O’Shea said. “Disrupt the logistics, you shut down your enemy’s offensive.”

S&L is also a member of DHS’s Critical Manufacturing Sector Coordinating Council (CMSCC), which works with the government to “plan, implement and execute sufficient and necessary sector-wide security and resilience programs for the nation’s [critical manufacturing] facilities and other infrastructure assets within the [critical manufacturing] sector.”

“[The CMSCC] position not only provides insight into potential risks, but also offers an opportunity to exploit those vulnerabilities,” Eads said. “[A Chinese government asset] could promote foreign agendas, subtly shape policies to align with CCP interests, and even steal intellectual property or sensitive knowledge shared within the council.”

The U.S. government must keep individuals with Chinese government ties from operating as U.S. defense contractors, let alone within CMSCC, Eads told the DCNF.

“Given his dual role in the aerospace defense sector, [an individual with Chinese government ties] could leverage this information to benefit the [People’s Liberation Army], undermining U.S. military readiness and supply chain security,” Eads said. “The CCP would use [such a person] to copy military components, map out supply chain vulnerabilities, steal intellectual property, and even sabotage critical manufacturing.”

“Congress needs to step in and fix this now because the DOD clearly isn’t doing enough to protect us from this blatant national security threat,” Eads said.