Two House committees called on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on Tuesday to provide a classified briefing addressing the threat of multiple suspected Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spy installations throughout Cuba, according to a letter exclusively obtained by the Daily Caller News Foundation.
The letter, sent by the House Homeland Security Committee and House Select Committee on the CCP to DHS Secretary Kristi Noem, requests a formal threat assessment from the department regarding at least four signals intelligence (SIGINT) installations in Cuba the Chinese government โis establishing, or has already established.โ The suspected Chinese spy installations are as close as 90 miles off the U.S. coast, the letter warns, positioning them to intercept sensitive intelligence from Kennedy Space Center, Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Cape Canaveral Space Force Station and Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, which sits just 70 miles from one of the sites in question.
The letter was signed by five Republican representatives including House Homeland Security Committee chairman Mark Green of Tennessee, Select Committee on the CCP chairman John Moolenaar of Michigan, Carlos Gimenez of Florida, Sheri Biggs of South Carolina and Eli Crane of Arizona.
โIt is vital for Congress to have the necessary information to counter the growing threat of the CCPโs intelligence operations just 90 miles from the homeland,โ Green told the DCNF. โWe cannot stand by as the CCP and the authoritarian Cuban regime become more politically and economically intertwined, especially as Beijing works to build up capabilities to wage electronic and information warfare that directly undermines U.S. national security.โ
Three of the suspected Chinese spy installations are clustered around Cubaโs capital of Havana in nearby Bejucal, Wajay and Calabazar, according to a July 2024 Center For Strategic & International Studies report cited in the letter. A fourth site is reportedly on the southeast corner of the island in the neighborhood of El Salao within the city of Santiago de Cuba.
โThe security risks posed by these developments are particularly acute across the air, space, and maritime domains,โ the letter states. โBy fusing telemetry interception, geospatial intelligence collection, and electromagnetic surveillance, [China] is positioning itself to systematically erode U.S. strategic advantages without ever firing a shot.โ
The installations have all โexhibited signs of development in recent years,โ with the Bejucal base, for example, now featuring a โcircular disposed antenna arrayโ and โrepositioned satellite dishes,โ which suggest a โfocus on long-range, wideband electromagnetic surveillance,โ according to the letter.
โCollectively, these developments reflect a deliberate expansion of [Chinaโs] surveillance infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere and signal a long-term investment in asymmetric capabilities near U.S. shores,โ the letter states.
Since 2000, China has provided Cuba with almost $8 billion to finance various infrastructure projects across the island, such as a sprawling telecommunications network built by Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation, โboth of which have been sanctioned by the U.S. government for their roles in global surveillance and repression,โ according to the letter.
The U.S. government has slapped Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment Corporation (ZTE) and Huawei with a number sanctions in recent years, such as a November 2022 ruling by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to prohibit U.S. sales and imports of equipment from both companies, citing an โunacceptable risk to national security.โ
โThe integration of these technologies into Cubaโs digital infrastructure raises the specter of regional communications exposure to [Chinese government]-linked platforms,โ the letter states.
In light of Chinaโs apparent growing presence within Cuba, the committeeโs letter requests for DHS to provide a classified briefing as well as written responses for five questions related to the departmentโs analysis of the suspected Chinese installations and its ongoing countermeasures.
In addition to requesting a general overview of DHSโs โcurrent assessment of [Chinaโs] intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba,โ the letter also presses the department to detail โknown or suspected infrastructure developmentsโ at the suspected sites.
Other questions in the letter probe whether or not DHS has taken steps to coordinate with entities inside and outside of the U.S. government to counter the suspected threat. One such question asks DHS to detail the โextent and effectiveness of DHSโs interagency coordination efforts, particularly with the Department of Defense, the [intelligence community], and the Department of State, to monitor, analyze, and counter [Chinaโs] intelligence and security activities in Cuba.โ
A related question inquires as to whether or not DHS has taken steps to โraise awareness among industry and government entities about risks related to [Chinaโs] surveillance platforms in Cuba.โ
China is โthe only competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order,โ according to the Department of Defense. Chinese espionage โexpanded rapidlyโ in the U.S. during the Biden administration, with at least 59 โCCP-relatedโ criminal cases occurring in the homeland between February 2021 and August 2024, according to a House Committee On Homeland Security โChina Threat Snapshotโ first reported by the DCNF in October 2024.
โIf left unchecked, [Chinaโs] activities in Cuba could establish a forward operating base for electronic warfare, enable intelligence collection, and influence operations that directly undermine U.S. national security interests,โ the letter warns.



